ABSTRACT
I. Introduction
Empirical evidence from a wide variety of high-income and lowincome countries has established a strong negative association between women's schooling and fertility, and a strong positive association between women's schooling and child outcomes such as health, survival, and schooling attainment. Schultz 
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(1993) calls the strong link between women's education and fertility "one of the most important discoveries in research on nonmarket returns to women's education,'' documenting in his survey that women with seven or more years of schooling have substartially lower fertility than women with zero years of schooling in all parts of the world.' The effects of schooling at low levels, an important focus of this paper, appear to differ across regions, with large negative effects in Asia and Latin America, but with small negative or even small positive effects in Africa (Ainsworth, Beegle, and N^amete 1994) . Increases in education appear to affect both the desired fertility of couples and the couples' ability to realize those goals. Several studies, such as Rosen7weig and Schultz (1985) . indicate that better educated women have fewer unwanted births. The negative relationship between schooling and realized fertility is not simply due to increased ability to control fertility, however, with data on fertility preferences indicating negative effects of women's education on desired family size in all parts of the world {Schultz 1993).
A large empirical literature also documents the beneficial effects of mother's schooling on numerous health and human capital outcomes for children. -Strauss and Thomas (1995) survey a large literature documenting the strong positive association ot mother's education with child survival in developing countries. Effects of father's education also tend to be positive, although generally smaller than the effects of mother's education. In addition to the effects of parental schooling on child health, parents' schooling is as.sociated with positive effects on other child outcomes, especially schooling (Strauss and Thomas 1995; Barros and Lam 1996) . Recent analysis by Behrman et al. (1997) for India suggest that effects of mother's schooling on children's schooling result from real productivity returns to mothers' human capital, an interpretation consistent with the approach we take below. The well-documented positive effects of matemal .'-chooling on child outcomes have been widely noticed by international agencies, and have been in the forefront of policy forums such as the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. The empirical evidence has had a large influence on policy, as exemplified by the statement in a well-known address by Lawrence Summers (1992) . then Chief Economist of the World Bank, that "once all the benefits are recognized, investment in the education of girls may be the highest return investment available in the developing world," This paper examines the effects of schooling on fertility and investments in children in Brazil. Brazil provides an intriguing case study for several reasons. Brazil's fertility decline began during a period in which the country had few organized family planning programs. It is probably the best example of a developing country experiencing rapid fertility decline in the absence of a major family planning effort. It is also notewonhy that the fenility decline began during the rapid economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s, but continued at a similar pace during the recessionary 1980s (Merrick 1989 : Martine 1995 . Previous research, including Merrick and Berquo (1983) and Lam, Sedlacek. and Duryea (1992) , suggests that increases in schooling, especially for women, play a major role in explaining this decline, The fact that schooling could be such an important factor is surprising, since Brazil has had disappointing pertbrniance in the level, rate of growth, and quaHty of education (Birdsall and Sabot 1996) . As .shown below, however, although Brazil's schooling performance has been poor by international standards, there have nonetheless been substantial improvements, especially at the bottom of the distribution. We will also document a strong negative relationship between schooling and fertility, especially at early years of schooling. The combination of steady increases in schooling and a strong relationship between schooling and fertility means thai increases in schooling can account for a large proportion of Brazil's fenility decline.
Although the negative relationship between mother's schooling and fertility is well documented, the causes of this relationship are not well understood. Sociologists have emphasized the relationship between women's education and women's status. Mason (1986) argues that women's education increases female autonomy, leading to later marriage, increased contraceptive use, and lower fertility. Mason finds support for a link between women's autonomy and fertility in the widely observed result that wife's education has a more negative effect on fertility than does husband's education (Cochrane 1983; Cleland and Rodriguez 1988) . Economists have emphasized the effect that increased schooling has on women's labor market opportunities, with schooling raising market wages and inducing substitution out of time-intensive activities such as children (Birdsall 1988; Schultz 1993) . Economists have estimated strong negative effects of women's wages on fertility in a variety of countries, with wife's wages having a more negative effect on fertility than husband's wages. Although Brazil's fertility decline does coincide with increases in women's labor force participation, we will see below that there is a surprisingly weak link between fertility and labor supply in the cross-section in response to increases in women's schooling. This paper emphasizes an alternative mechanism linking increases in parents' schooling to fertility decline. Noting the strong positive effect of parental schooling on human capital outcomes, we consider the effect of schooling on parents' tradeoffs between the quantity and quality of children. If schooling increases parents" productivity in producing healthy and well educated children, a plausible outcome is that parents will reduce fertility at the same time that they increase investments in child quality. Increases in the productivity of women's time in home production may in tum cause reservation wages to rise as fast as market wages, especially at low levels of schooling. This may prevent increases in women's schooling from pulling women into the labor market, even if schooling leads to higher market wages. In order to understand these issues, we believe it is important to look simultaneously at the effects of schooling on fertility, wages, labor supply, and children's human capital outcomes.
Our empirical analysis is based on retrospective fertility histories of over 100,000 Brazilian women. We summarize trends in schooling and fertility in recent decades. and document the strong negative relationship between fertility and schooling. Combining the changes in the distribution of schooling and the relationship between schooling and fertility, we demonstrate that improvements in schooling can account for around 70 percent of Brazil's fertility decline during the 1960s and 1970s. Analyzing the mechanisms through which schooling affects fertility, we first show that declines in fertility are only weakly associated with increases in women's labor force participation, especially at low levels of schooling. Over the first eight years of schooling we observe sharp declines in fertility and large increases in market wages, but little or no increase in women's labor force participation. We find much stronger links between increases in schooling and improvements in child survival and children's schooling attainment. Our interpretation of this evidence is that the effects of parental schooling on fertility work primarily through parents increasing investments in child quality in response to increased productivity in dimensions such as child health and child schooling. Effects working through the labor market appear to plaj a relatively minor role in explaining the effect of schooling on fertility.
II. Theoretical background
We emphasize two important economic tradeoffs in interpreting our empirical results below. First is the tradeoff between quantity and quality of children. Given the strong effects of schooling on both fertility and children's human capital, we think it is important to look at both the "quantity" and "quality'" outcomes simultaneously. The second tradeoff is between time allocated at home and time allocated to the labor force. Since the value of women's time has been an important component of economic theories of fertility, we want to keep wages and labor force participation in mind as we examine the effect of schooling on fertility. In this section we lay out some of the essential theoretical issues important in thinking about the simultaneous tradeoffs between quantity and quality of children and between home production and employment.
The seminal models of child quantity and quality developed by Willis (1973) , Becker and Lewis (1973) , and Becker tl991) provide a useful framework for thinking about the way that increa.ses in parental schooling might affect choices about the quantity and quality of children. A basic insight of these models is that the shadow prices of child quantity and child quality are inextricably linked. As long as the quality chosen for one child is related to the quality chosen for other children, the choice of child quality will affect the opportunity cost of adjusting child quantity and vice versa. The comparative statics of quantity-quality models have two important implications relevant to our analysis. Eirst. an increase in the unit price of quality (say the price of schooling) that raises the shadow price of both child quality and child quantity may lead to substitution effects that are positive for at least one (but not both) of these outcomes. The second implication of this type of quality-quantity model is that substitution effects can be greatly exaggerated because of the nonlinearity of the budget constraint. This effect, as noted by Becker (1991) . may help explain the rapid declines in fertility and corresponding rapid increases in children's human capital in response to relatively modest changes in the shadow price of children. In our model this tendency for large substitution effects applies not only to changes in contraceptive technology or market prices, but also to the effect of schooling on parents' productivity in producing child quality.
The key question for our purposes is what the effects of increased parental schooling v/ill be on the shadow price of a unit of child quality. Eocusing on the wife's schooling, increases in schooling will have two effects on the unit price of child quality. First, increased schooling should increase productivity, corresponding to a decrease in the amount of time and goods required to produce a unit of quality. Schooling should also increase the market wage for the wife, an effect that will tend to increase the unit price of quality, potentially offsetting the productivity gains. It is an empirical question whether an increase in wife's schooling tends on net to increase or decrease the shadow price of quality. One result that is theoretically plausible is that an increase in schooling will lower the relative price of child quality, leading parents to increase the average quality of children and decrease the quantity of children. Becker (1991) argues that the empirical relationship between quality and quantity of children from virtually all populations implies that parents rapidly increase child quality in response to increases in income, with associated decreases in the quantity of children. Such responses imply in our case that schooling-induced reductions in the unit price of quality will lead to increases in child quality and decreases in the quantity of children.
The second dimension in whicb couples are making tradeoffs is the allocation of time between the labor market and care for children. The mother's schooling may have important effects on this tradeoff, as emphasized in many economic theories of fertility decline. Increased schooling will increase the probability that a woman works in the labor market if and only if the schooling causes a larger increase in her market wage than in her reservation wage. Assuming that schooling increases productivity in both the home and market sectors, we expect that both the reservation wage and the market wage rise with increased schooling. The empirical question is which rises faster, determining whether the labor force participation rate rises or falls with increased schooling. While the experience of high-income countries sugge.sts that labor market productivity increases faster than home productivity, it may well be the case that for women with low levels of schooling (and large numbers of children) the increase in home productivity from an additional year of schooling is as large as the increase in market productivity. It is also plausible that while schooling raises labor market productivity at all levels of schooling, effects of schooling on home productivity face diminishing returns. Reservation wages may therefore rise as fast as market wages at low levels of schooling, but rise more slowly than the market wage at higher levels of schooling. In this case increases in schooling would not increase labor force participation at low levels of schooling, but would increase participation al higher levels of schooling.
The effect of schooling on fertility, child quality, and women's lahor supply, then, can be viewed theoretically as being driven by tradeoffs along two margins. One margin is the race between home productivity and labor market productivity, driving the extent to which better educated women are pulled into the labor force by higher wages. The other margin is the adjustments in child quality and child quantity that result from the effects of schooling on home productivity. Although economic theory offers no unambiguous predictions, it does suggest that looking at the effects of schooling on fertility, labor supply, wages, and investments in children simultaneously will be more revealing than looking at any single outcome alone. These theoretical points also provide a useful foundation for interpreting our empirical results, which we believe indicate a powerful role of quality-quantity tradeoffs in explaining the effects of schooling on fertility. 
III. Fertility and schooling in Brazil
The relationship between fertility and schooling in Brazil is consistent with the pattern observed in other countries. Figure I demonstrates the strong negative relationship between women's education and fertility in Brazil using data on single years of schooling-The data are taken from the 1984 version of Brazil's Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD), a large annual household survey collected by the Brazilian statistical bureau. The 1984 PNAD included an extensive fertility and marital history supplement administered to more than 100,000 women between tbe ages of 15 and 55.' Figure I shows the number of children ever bom alive and the number of children still surviving at the time of the survey, classified hy single years of completed schooling, for all women aged 45-54. The figure   ; }. The 1984 PNAD fertihty supplement is used throughout this paper. We have deliberately chosen it Liver otlier Brazilian fenility survey.' such as the 1986 Demographic and Heaith Survey because the much larger sample size allows us to analyse narrowly defined schooling and age categories. The total samplê ize represented in Figure I i.s 18.937 women aged 45-54. making it possible to get meaningful estimates of completed fertility for single years of schooling.
demonstrates the large differences in fertility across years of women's schooling. Women with zero years of schooling (about 40 percent of the women aged 45-54) report an average of 6.5 live births. This falls rapidly with the first few years of schooling, falling to 4.2 births for women with four years of schooling. Women with more than 10 years of schooling report about three total births or fewer. Figure I also demonstrates the large differences in child .survival across education groups. Women with zero years of schooling lost an average of 1.2 children, a survival rate of only 81 percent. Women with more than 11 years of schooling report an average of only 0.1 or 0.2 death.s.. for survival rates of over 90 percent. We will return to the issue of child health and child survival below when we consider the interaction between fertility and investments in child quality. It is important to note that the simple bivariate relationship in Figure I includes the effects of many variables correlated with women's schooling, such as region, race, marital status, and husband's schooling and income. In the regressions below we will control for a number of these variables. For now we simply note that the steep relationship between women's schooling and fertility suggests that even modest improvements in the distribution of schooling could lead to substantial declines in overall fertility. The relationship in Figure 1 also raises intriguing questions about why even very low levels of schooling are associated with large declines in fertility.
An important backdrop to our analysis is the low mean and high variance of schooling in Brazil. Brazil's highly unequal distribution of schooling has been widely noted, with important implications for Brazil's highly unequal distribution of income and for many demographic and health outcomes (Lam and Levison 1992; Birdsall and Sabot 1996) . The high inequality is associated with alow mean level of schooling in comparison to countries at similar levels of per capita income (Birdsail and Sabot 1996) . Although the mean level of schooling for both men and women remains low by international standards, there have been steady improvements in recent decades. Table I documents trends in schooling for male and female cohorts bom between 1925 and 1963. based on the cross-sectional relationship between schooling and age in the 1985 PNAD survey. Mean schooling for both males and females has increased steadily over time, doubling for both sexes over the four decades shown. The most rapid increase in the mean occurred for the cohorts bom from 1940 to 1954. We will see below that these cohorts play an important role in the early stages of the fertility decline. Table I also demonstrates a convergence in the educational attainment of men and women, with women's education rising faster than men's for all of the last four decades. Women's mean schooling has been higher than men's schooling since the 1955-57 birth cohort.
The last two columns of Table I show that the percentage of each cohort with less than one year of schooling has declined steadily for both men and women, with a faster decline for women. The percentage of women with less than one year of schooling was more than 40 percent for women born between 1925 and 1927, falling to under 10 percent for the youngest cohorts. The percentage of women with less than one year of schooling dropped below the percentage for men beginning with cohorts bom in the mid-1950s. The declining proportion of men and women with less than one year of schooling plays a key role in the decline in schooling inequality. As seen in Table I . the coefficient of variation declined steadily for both men and women during the four decades shown. As will be seen below, the large improvement in the bottom of the schooling distribution ha.s important implications for trends in fertility, given the strong negative relationship between fertility and education at the lowest years of schooling.
A. SchooUng as a determinant of Brazil's fertility decline
Given the combination of a strong negative effect of schooling on fertility, espeeially at low levels of schooling, and improvements in tbe distribution of schooling, it is plausible that the increases in sehooling played an important role in Brazil's fertility decline. Lam, Sedlacek, and Duryea (1992) document the decline in period and cohort fertility measures using the 1984 PNAD fertility histories. Period fertility began to decline in Brazil around 1965. The decline appears to be largely a cohort phenomenon, with the cohorts bom in the early 1940s exhibiting sharp declines in fertility compared to earlier cohorts. Cumulative fertility up to age 30, for example, fell from 3.31 for the 1938-40 birth cohort to 2.75 for the 1951-53 cohort. As shown in Table  1 , the cohorts bom in the 1940s experienced some of the most rapid improvements in schooling, suggesting that schooling may have played an important role in the fertility decline.
In order to quantify the explanatory power of schooling in Brazil's fertility decline, we estimate regressions of cumulative fertility on a highly flexible function of schooling. Table 2 presents weighted least squares regressions using children bom by age 30, as calculated from individual fertility bistories, as the dependent variable. The sample is restricted to women in marital unions (broadly defined) in order to include the effect of husband's schooling in the analysis. Separate regressions are estimated for women ages 30-35 and 45-49 at the time of the survey.•* The regressions use 16 dummy variables for the schooling of the husband and wife to identify the effect of schooling in the most flexible way.' As can be seen from the regression coefficients, the strong negative relationship between wife's schooling and fertility shown in Figure I continues to be observed when husband's schooling is included in the regression. An increase in wife's schooling from 0 years to 4 years is associated with a reduction in children bom by age 30 of 0.85 births for the younger women and 0.60 births for the older women. Surprisingly, there are effects of similar magnitudes associated with husband's schooling. An increase in husband's schooling from 0 to 4 years is associated with 0.84 fewer births by age 30 for the younger women, and 0.43 fewer births by age 30 for the older women.'' The partial effects of husband's and wife's schooling, and the way these are affected by including additional regressors, will be discussed in more detail below. In 4. The 14.239 currently marrleJ women ages 30-34 used in the first regression in Table 2 represent 93 percenl of all ever-married wotnen and 77 percent of all women ages 30-34. Of the women incltided in the regression, 92 percent have been married only once. The 7.595 women ages 45-49 used in the second regressioti iti Table 2 represetil 81 perceni of all ever-married women and 72 percent of all women ages 45-49. Of the women included in the regression, 89 percent have been married only once. 5. The combination of a large sample and a dense distribution of schooling across all levels in Brazil makes it realistic to identify the.se partial effects of single years of schooling for husbands and wives, even with a high correlation in husband's and wife's schooling (over 0.7 in our sample). As seen in the table, the standard errors arc getierally small, with the separate coefficients estimated quite preci.sely. 6. tn these regressions and throughout the rest of the paper we treat the schooling of husbands and wives as exogenous. We discuss this and other methodological issues in the final section of the paper. the regressions in Table 2 we use only the schooling variables so that we can predict fertility for each cohort as a function of changes in the schooling distribution. Using the coefficients in Table 2 we can predict how much cohort fertility would have declined based only on the increases in schooling for men and women. Assuming that the behavioral relationship between years of education and cumulative fertility to age 30 remains exactly as described in the first regression in Table 2 . and given the changes in the di.stribution of schooling for cohorts of women bom between 1935 and 1952 and their husbands, we predict the level of fertility for each cohort. We compare our predictions to the actual fenility experience of each cohort in order to see how well we predict the onset of fertility decline and the pace of decline across cohorts.' Figure 2 shows the result of predicting cohort fertility in this way. The figure shows actual and predicted fertility to age 30 for each cohort bom from 1935 to 1952, with the series for actual fertility smoothed as three-year moving averages. The lower line shows the values predicted for each cohort using the regression coefficients in the first column of Table 2 (the regression for women ages 30-34) combined with the actual schooling distribution for each cohort. The fact that the predicted values and the actual values are similar for the youngest cohorts i.s simply the result of the fact that the regression was estimated on women from these cohorts. We are more interested in how well we predict out of the sample. The graph shows that we predict a large proportion of the change in fertility, although we underpredict fertility for the older women when we predict using the coefficients for the younger women. We predict that women in the cohorts bom around 1940 would have had about 3.15 births by age 30, when in fact they had about 3.29 births by age 30. We are able to account for a large proportion, but not 100 percent, of the change in fertility across cohorts.
The top line in Figure 2 shows the results of predicting each cohort's fertility based on the regression coefficients estimated for women aged 45-49. As must be tme by construction, we come close to predicting the fertility for the older women. We now find that we overpredict fertility for the younger cohorts, although once again we predict well over half of the total fertility decline across cohorts. Figure  2 shows that we can predict many of the major features of Brazil's fertility decline. Most striking is the fact that we predict a sharp drop in fertility at the same time it actually occurred, beginning with the 1940 birth cohort. As shown in Table I , an increase in the rate of growth of schooling began with the 1940 cohort. We have evidence in Figure 2 that this increase in .schooling does in fact produce a substantial decline in cohort fertility, a decline that we are able to accurately predict from a model based only on the relationship between fertility and schooling. Similarly, the leveling of the fertility decline for the mid 1940s cohorts, and the subsequent reacceleration of the decline, are at least partially picked up in our predicted fertility 7. For each cohon of women in the 1984 survey we estimate the distribution of years of schooling for married women and their husbands. For example, wecalculale the completedistributionof years of schooling for women bom in 1940. and also calculate the distribution of schooling for their htisbands. We then predict the cumulative fertility ID age 30 for that cohort of women based on their education and the education of their husbands. We do noi aitempt tn deal with the fact ihat the husbands observed in 1984 were not necessarily presem when thildbearing decisions were made. Otir analysis of the marital histories in the survey suggests that this does not create any sigtiificant biases. Table 2 and actual schooling distribution for each cohort.
rates. What we are not able to replicate is the steepness of the fertility declines beginning with the 1941 cohort and the 1946 cohort. We can summarize these results by comparing the magnitude of our predicted fertility declines with those actually observed. Looking at the two cohorts used for the regressions in Table 2 , cumulative fertility to age 30 fell from 3.26 for women ages 45-49 (the 1935-39 birth cohort) to 2.77 for the women ages 30-34 (the 1950-54 cohort), a decline of 0.49 births. Using the coefficients from the older women's regression combined with the younger women's schooling distribution, we predict that fertility would have fallen by 0.33 births. In other words, we are able to predict 68 percent of the actual decline. Using the coefficients from the younger women's regression combined with the older women's schooling distribution, we predict that fertility would have fallen by 0.38 births between the 1935-39 cohort and the 1950-54 cohort. This is 77 percent of the actual decline. This exercise, then, indicates that im[)rovemcnts in the distribution of schooling, when combined with the strong negative effect of schooling on fertility, can explain around 70 percent of Brazil's fertility decline during the 1960s and 1970s. This large role of schooling raises the question of why schooling has such a large impact on fertility. The following sections explore this question.
IV. Explaining the effect of schooling on fertility
We now turn to analysis of the mechanisms through which schooling affects fertility. Drawing on our theoretical discussion, we will analyze the relationship between schooling and other important outcome variables, including wives' labor force participation, wages, child survival rates, and children's schooling. We begin by pointing out several important features of the regressions in Table 2 . The top panel of Figure 3 plots predicted fertility to age 30 as a function of wife's and husband's schooling, ba.sed on the regression for the younger women in Table 2 . The series labeled "wife's schooling" shows predicted fertility as a function of wife's schooling, holding her husband's schooling constant al 4 years. The series labeled "husband's schooling" shows predicted fertility as a function of husband's schooling, holding the wife's schooling constant at four years." A striking feature of the graph is that the partial effect of husband's schooling is very similar to the effect of wife's schooling at early years of .schooling. The effects of wife's and husband's schooling begin to differ around eight years of schooling, the end of primary school in Brazil. Above this level there is virtually no partial effect of husband's schoohng on fertility, while the effect of wife's schooling continues to be negative.
A. The effect of schooling on fertility and labor supply
As pointed out in the theoretical discussion, an important mechanism through which women's schooling affects fertility is through its effect on wages. Increases in schooling should increase productivity in the labor market, leading to increases in wages and employment opportunities. Given the relative time intensity of children, this plausibly leads to a tradeoff between fertility and labor market work. As a first test of the importance of this link, we estimate probit regressions for labor force participation of wives as a function of wives' and husbands' schooling. These regressions use the same sample and the same flexible specification of schooling as the fertility regressions shown above. The results of these probits are presented in Table  A2 and in the bottom panel of Figure 3 , which plots the predicted labor force participation rates for wives as a function of the schooling of the wife and husband. As in the top panel, the series marked "wife's schooling" shows the effect of varying the wife's schooling when the husband's schooling is held constant at four years. The series marked "husband's schooling "shows the effect of varying the husband's schooling when the wife's schooling is held constant at four years. Figure 3 shows several important results from the participation probits. First, as was the case with the fertility regression, the partial effects of husband's and wife's schooling are remarkably similar at levels of schooling below seven years. At these low levels of schooling there is a slightly negative effect of husband's schooling and a slightly positive effect of wife's schooling, consistent with economic predictions, but both effects are close to zero. Second, the effects of schooling become much larger above eight years of schooling, and are in opposite directions for husbands and wives. Consistent with the own-wage and cross-wage effects predicted by 8. The level of four years for spouse's schooling is chosen because it is the modal year of schooling. Choosing some other level of spouse's schooling would simply cause a parallel shift in the series. an economic model of hou.sehold labor supply, the wife's participation is positively affected by her own schooling, but is negatively affected by her husband's schooling. The third important feature of Figure 3 is that the relationship between labor force participation and schooling in the bottom panel is not easily reconciled with the relationship between fertility and schooling in the top panel. Fertility falls rapidly with years of schooling of both husband and wife, even at low levels of schooling. Labor force participation of wives, however, shows little responsiveness to schooling of either spouse until around eight years of schooling.
The apparent effects of schooling in both the fertility and labor force participation regressions may pick up effects of variables omitted from these regressions. We will analyze this issue below, demonstrating that the inclusion of additional variables attenuates the effects of schooling but does not change the basic pattem shown in Figtire 3. Another important consideration is life-cycle timing issues. Our fertility measure is a cumulative outcome, while labor supply is measured at the time of the survey. Since we are looking at 30-34 year olds, it is possible that some of the surprising pattems in Figure 3 result from differences in the timing of fertility and labor supply by women at different schooling levels. We also analyze this issue below, where we show that the pattems of schooling, fertility, and labor supply for women ages 35-39 and 40-44 are similar to those for women 30-34. It is also worth considering the possibility that the weak relationship between participation rates and schooling over the first 8 years of schooling may conceal some stronger relationship between schooling and hours worked. We have analyzed this relationship in detail, and find no significant relationship between women's schooling and mean hours worked, conditional on working positive hours. Mean hours worked in the labor market are between 36 and 40 hours at all schooling levels.'' We also note that our results are almost identical if we use an alternative measure of labor supply, the proportion of women with positive labor eamings in the previous month.
B. The effect of schooling on market wages and reservation wages
Given the small response of labor force participation to increases in schooling at low levels, it is natural to consider the possibility that such low levels of schooling have little effect on labor market productivity, and therefore little effect on wages. Figure 4 shows the relationship between wages and single years of schooling for women and men aged 30-34 with positive monthly wages. The figure shows the log wage of each schooling group relative to the wage for women with zero years of schooling, without attempting to correct for selectivity into the sample of wage earners. Abstracting from potential selection bias, the figure shows that increases in schooling at low levels are associated with large wage increases for both men and women.'" Women with one year of schooling have wages 20 percent higher than 9. For women aged 30-34 mean hours worked in all jobs, conditional on working positive hours, are 36.7. 39.3. 38.2. 35.5. and 35.3 for women with 0. 4. 8. 11. and 15 years of schooling respectively. For women aged 35-39 the corresponding mean hours are 36.4, 39.2, 39.1. 35.0. and 36.1. Results for women aged 40-44 are very similar, indicating roughly constant mean hours al all schooling levels, conditional oti working positive hours. 10. As shown in Schoeni (1993| and Straus.s and Thomas (1996) , the patlem of high retums to single years of schooling across the entire schooling distribution in Brazil are somewhat attenuated, but by no means eliminated, by controls for family background, region, and other variables. The shape of the women with zero schooling. Compared to women with zero schooling, women with four years of schooling have wages 1.8 times higher, and women with eight years of schooling have wages 3.3 times higher. As seen in the figure, the slope of the wage-schooling profile is similar for men and women at each year of schooling, with the women's profile becoming somewhat steeper than men's at higher levels. Men have a wage advantage of 0.62 log points (86 percent) at four years of schooling, falling to 0.46 (58 percent) at 15 years."
The most surprising thing about the steep wage-schooling profile for women is that we see virtually no corresponding increase in women's labor supply for the first eight years of schooling in Figure 3 .'' Looking at the bivariate relationships between schooling, wages, and labor supply (reported below in Table 4 ), although women aged 30-34 with eight years of schooling have market wages that are 3.3 times wage profiles shown in Figure 4 are quite robust with respecl to altemative specifications of the wage equation and across different sampk: years. 11. The narrower male-female wage gap ai higher levels of schooling plays an important role in the improvemtnts in the male-female wage gap over time, as dtKumcnted hy Duryea (1993|. 12. The simple bivariate relationship between schcxiling and women's labor force participation rale (the proportion of women working or lociking for work in the previous week) shows the .same flat profile over the first eight yeiirs of schooling as the partial effect shown in Figure 3 . followed by a rapid increase In participation at higher levels of schixiling. higher than women the same age with zero schooling, the labor force participation rate only increases from 32 to 37 percent between zero and eight years of schooling. By contrast, labor force participation rises from 37 to 77 percent between eight and fifteen years of schooling, associated with a wage increase of 3.6 times.
One explanation for this weak link between schooling and labor supply, in spite of large increases in market wages, is that women's reservation wages rise as fast as market wages at low levels of schooling. Assuming that women work whenever their market wage exceeds their reservation wage, and assuming that the observed increase in market wages for working women translate into increases in potential market wages for nonworking women as well, the pattern of reservation wages necessary to explain the observed patterns in labor supply and wages in Figure 3 and 4 is that reservation wages increase as fast as market wages over the first eight years of schooling. Above eight years reservation wages rise at a slower rate than market wages, leading to increased participation rates.
We argue that this is a plausible relationship between reservation wages and schooling, and that it is directly related to fertility and investments in child quality. At low levels of schooling there are large returns to schooling in the production of child quality. This increased productivity in the home sector potentially leads to large increases in reservation wages, especially for women with large numbers of children. While it is plausible that reservation wages rise as fast as market wages at low levels of schooling, it is also likely that there are diminishing returns to human capital in home production. In the market sector the returns to human capita! occur partly because individuals move into different jobs as their human capital increases. There are fewer possibilities for switching jobs in the home sector, implying that the returns to human capital are more likely to diminish at higher levels. The Brazilian data suggest that the race between market wages and reservation wages in response to increased schooling appears to be roughly a draw for women over the first eight years of schooling, with market wages rising much faster than reservation wages above eight years of schooling.
C. Fertility and investments in child quality
The above results suggest that an increase in the opportunity cost of children due to rising wages is unlikely to be the major reason that increases in women's schooling are associated with sharp declines in fertility in Brazil. In spite of large increases in market wages, women do not substantially increase their market labor supply as their schooling increases. In this section we consider an alternative mechanism that focuses on "quality-quantity" tradeoffs in parental time allocation. As noted above, increases in .schooling will plausibly have large effects on parents' tradeoff between the number of children and investments in children's human capital. As in many developing countries, Brazilian data indicate that increases in parental schooling are associated with significant improvements in children's survival, health, and schooling attainment. Barro.s and Lam (1996) estimate large effects of both mother's and father's schooling on the schooling attainment of 14-year-old Brazilian children. Thomas, Strauss, and Henriques (1991) estimate positive effects of both mother's and father's schooling on child height and child survival in Brazil.
In order to analyze the effects of parents' schooling on child quality, we estimate regressions using two outcomes that we can construct in our data, child survival and child schooling attainment. As above, we use single years of schooling of wife and husband as regressors. These regressions are reported in Tables A3 and A4. Table  A3 presents estimates using two measures of child survival, the probability that the first child survived to age 1 and the probability that the first child survived to age 5.'F igure 5 presents predicted values for both outcomes as a function of each parent's schooling, holding the spouse's schooling at four years. The top panel shows the probability that the mother's first child survived to age five for women ages 30-44.'^ i^stimating separate effects for all 16 years of schooling for both mother and father is pushing the data hard, as evidenced by the somewhat erratic estimates at higher schooling levels. The coefficients at low levels of schooling are estimated fairly precisely, however, given the large cell sizes. We focus on the effects of these low levels of schooling, since they may be closely related to changes in fertility at these levels. The top panel of Figure 5 shows large effects of both mother's and Father s .schooling on child survival. An increase from zero years of schooling to Four years of schooling for cither the mother or the father is associated with more than a 50 percent decrease in the probability that the first child dies within the first five years. Table A3 shows that these effects are reduced, but by no means eliminated, when controls are included for region, race, father's income, and age at marriage.
The bottom panel of Figure 5 plots predicted values for a different measure of child quality, the schooling attainment of 14-year-oIds. These estimates use the sample of 5,792 couples with a 14-year-old child at the time of the survey. Once again we see large effects of parental schooling at low levels of schooling, with surprisingly similar effects for mothers and fathers. An increase in either the mother's or lather's schooling from 0 to 4 years is associated with about a 1.5 year increase in the grade attainment of 14-year-old children. When controls for race, region, age at marriage, and hjsband s income are included, the effect is 1.0 years for mothers and 0.7 years for fathers.
These results suggest that there is a strong link between fertility and investments in children. We hypothesize that increases in schooling at low levels lead to increases in the productivity of both mothers and fathers in producing healthier and better educated children. Parents respond to this increased productivity in a way consistent with i:he theoretical arguments outlined above-they choose higher levels of child quality and reduce the number of children. Increases in women's schooling also lead to increased labor market productivity, as evidenced by the large rise in wages. In making labor supply decisions, however, women are faced with simultaneous increases in home productivity and labor market productivity. Over a large range of schooling it appears that increases in home productivity are large enough to offset even large increases in wages. Until about eight years of schooling we do not see 13. The samples are restricted to women whose lirst birth was at least one year and five years before the survey, respectively. 14, In our regressions for child survival and child schooling attainment we broaden the sample to the 30-44 age group in order to maintain sample size. The survival analysis must be limited to women who had at least one biith by age 25, and the schotiling analysis is limited lo women with a )4-year-old child at the time of the survey. Resiricting the sample lo the same .W-34 age group used for the earlier analysis does not substantially alter Ihe results, but they tecome highly erratic at less common years of schooling. 
Figure 5 Effects of Schooling of Mother and Father on Probability First Child Survives to Age 5 and Predicted Schooling Attainment of M-Year-Old Children, Holding Spouse's Schooling Constant at 4 Years, Married Brazilian Women Ages 30-44. 1984 PNAD. (Based on regressions reported in Appendix tables A3 and A4)
women responding to rising wages with significant increases in labor supply. The driving, mechanism through which schooling reduces fertility, then, does not appear to be rising opportunity cost oi' time due to rising wages. Rather, we argue, couples respond to their increased productivity in producing child quality by reducing the number of children and investing more resources in each child.
D. Effects of fertility timing and omitted variables
In this section we consider the robustness of our results, with an emphasis on two important issues^the inclusion of additional independent variables that are correlated with schooling and the analysis of women at different ages. The apparent effects of schooling in our fertility and labor force participation regressions may pick up effects of a number of omitted variables. In Tables AI and A2 we present several alternative specifications for both regressions. We include regional and urban dummies, a dummy for white.'^ age at marriage, and husband's income in both sets of regressions. Many of these viuiables are endogenous to some degree, so these regressions do not necessarily provide "better" estimates of the true effects of schooling. These alternative specifications provide useful information, however, about the extent to which the schooling coefficients pick up effects of other variables correlated with fertility.
These alternative specifications are summarized in Table 3 , which presents the estimated effects of schooling on fertility and wife's labor supply across major schooling years. The first column of Table 3 restates the effects presented in the first column of Table 2 , the regressions which include only schooling variables. The second column shows the effect of adding a dummy for white and regional dummies for Brazil's eight major regions in the regression. The apparent effect of schooling on feiiility is diminished by controlling for race and region, although the major features of thie relationship do not change. We continue to see a steep relationship between schooling and fertility at low levels. Regression 3 adds the wife's age at marriage. Not surprisingly, age at marriage is positively correlated with schooling, and including it in the regression reduces the apparent effect of schooling on fertility. A large effect remains, however, with fertility to age 30 falling by around half a birth when either the wife's or husband's schooling is increased from 0 to 4 years. Regression 4 includes the log of husband's income. This causes some additional reduction in the estimated effects of both partners" schooling. The cumulative effect of all these additional regressors is that the coefficients on low levels of schooling in the final regression are roughly half the size of those in the original regressions.
The right panel of Table 3 shows alternative specifications for a probit regression predicting wife's labor force participation. The first four correspond to the specifications used for the fertility regressions. The fifth specification, shown in Column 9, includes dummy variables for the number of children bom at the time of the survey. Fertility is undoubtedly endogenous, being jointly determined with wife's labor force participation. We include it here not to give it a causal interpretation, but simply to examine the extent of the link between fertility and labor supply across women, and 15. The 1984 PNAD included a question on color, to which respondenls could report white, brown, black, and yellow. to see whether its inclusion changes the estimated effect of schooling. Looking across Columns 5 through 9. we see that inclusion of regional dummies, marriage age, husband's income, and even the current number of children does not substantially alter the estimated effect of schooling on wife's labor supply. We do see some increase in the effect of low levels of wife's schooling on labor supply as additional regressors are included. These additional controls do little to answer the puzzles posed by the pattern of marginal effects shown in Figure 3 . which show large declines in fertility corresponding to little change in wife's labor force participation. It is instructive to look at the probit for wife's labor force participation that includes measures of fertility. This probit. summarized in Column 9 of Table 3 , is presented in Appendix Table A2 . Dummy variables for children ever born greater than zero, greater than one, greater than two. and greater than three, are included. We do not attempt to deal with the endogeneity of fertility, and use these probits simply as evidence of the covariance between fertility and labor force participation across women. Holding schooling, region, race, age at marriage, and husband's income constant, there is a substantial and statistically significant negative effect on labor supply of having at least one birth. Having at least one birth is associated with about a 10 percentage point decrease in labor force participation at the sample means. The effect of adding a second birth is statistically negative, but only implies a decrease in participation of about four percentage points. The effect of having a third or founh birth is small, and we cannot reject that the effect is zero. While these estimates have no clear causal interpretation, they suggest that differences in fertility across women are only weakly associated with differences in labor supply, especially among women who have had at least one child.
These alternative specifications shed some lighl on the extent to which our estimated effects of schooling arc influenced by the correlation between schooling and omitted variables that are observable in our data. Many of the variables that might bias our results are unobservable, however, such as ability and preferences. Our assumption that parental schooling is exogenous raises the same concerns in Brazil as it does in any other country. The relationship between schooling and many of our outcomes, for example, suggests that those completing degree years are positively selected compared to those tbat drop out one year before. The results of Lam and Schoeni (1993) and Strauss and Thomas (1996) suggest that family background (which we are unable to control for) may introduce bias in estimated effects of schooling on wages. Given the absence of convincing identifying instruments, we have not attempted to deal with the endogeneity of schooling with respect to unobservable characteristics such as ability or desire for children. With regard to the role of unobserved ability, we note that our explanation of the effects of schooling is heavily focused on a link between schooling and productivity, both at home and in the labor market. If increased schooling is associated with increased productivity because of unobserved ability or family background, rather than the effects of schooling per se. then our explanation of the association between schooling and the outcomes studied here remains essentially correct, with the important caveat that we may have overstated the effect that schooling would have on a randomly drawn individual.
Ano:her important methodological issue is the extent to which the patterns observed for 30-34-year-olds are misleading because they include life-cycle compo-nents of women's fertility and labor supply timing. Table 4 presents a summary of results for women in three different age groups. 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44 . The top panel presents means of log wage, fertility, and labor force participation at five important schooling levels, zero, four, eight, II. and 15 years. The mean log wage is normalized to zero for women ages 30-34 with zero schooling. The fertility measure is the cumulative number of children bom by the start of the age group interval (30. 35, and 40) . The bottom panel of Table 4 shows the predicted values for these same variables when the husband's schooling is held constant at four years and the wife's schooling is set to 0, 4, 8, 11, or 15 years, based on regressions that include 16 dummy variables for husband's and wife's schooling. Table 4 demonstrates that the effects of schooling on wages, fertility, and labor supply documented above for 30-34 year olds continue to hold for older women. For the 40-44 age group, women with 8 years of schooling have a 1.3 log point wage advantage (3.8 times higher wages) over women with no schooling, and have had only 3.1 births by age 40, compared to 6.2 for the women with no schooling. Yet the labor force participation rate of women with 8 years schooling is only 34 percent, compared to 33 percent for the women with no schooling. Similar comparisons hold for the 35-39 year old women. These results suggest that the patterns observed for women aged 30-34 persist across the life cycle. Increases in education over the first 8 years are associated with large declines in fertility, large increases in market wages, but no significant change in labor force participation. The results in the bottom panel of Table 4 make it possible to look at the partial effect of wife's sehooling. controlling for her husband's schooling. The basic patterns continue to hold, although there is more evidence of a positive effect of wife's schooling on labor supply when husband's schooling is held constant. Overall we find that the weak link between women's schooling and labor supply shown in Figure 4 holds across the life cycle, in spite of the fact that increased schooling is associated with large increases in wages and large declines in fertility at all ages.
Finally we report on results using alternative specifications of our regressions related to potential alternative meehanisms linking the schooling of husbands and wives to our outcomes. Although our use of 16 dummy variables for both husband and wife is highly flexible, a limitation of the specification is that it does not allow interactions between the spouses' schooling. To allow such interactions we have estimated regressions using a quadratic specification for each spouse's schooling plus an interaction term. Using cumulative fertility to age 30 as the dependent variable we estimate a positive and statistically significant interaction term, suggesting that the effect of one spouse's schooling is slightly less negative when the other spouse's schooling is higher. The inclusion of the interaction term has very little impact on the partial effect of either husband's or wife's schooling. In the case of our other outcomes-wife's labor supply, child survival, and children's schooling-the interaction term is not statistically significant. We have also used a dummy variable indicating that the wife has more schooling than the husband (true for one-third of the sample), a variable that may pick up the effects of intra-family bargaining. In the case of fertility we estimate a statistically significant value of 0.1 for this dummy, indicating slightly higher fertility when the wife has more schooling than her husband. The effect of this variable on the partial effects of husband's and wife's schooling is very small. In the case of the other three outcomes there is no statistically Schooling, Brazilian Womer, [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] significant effect of the wife having more schooling than her husband. It is beyond the scope of this paper to pursue these issues in detail, but our limited examination suggests that our speeification assuming additive effects of husband's and wife's schooling does not do major injustice to the data and is unlikely to lead to misleading inferences regarding the effects we have emphasized.
V. Conclusions I Increases in schooling for both men and women appear to play an important role in explaining Brazil's rapid fertility decline, a decline that took place in the absence of a significant family planning effort. We estimate that slow but steady improvements in the distribution of schooling, especially at low levels, combined with a strong negative effect of schooling on fertility, can explain around 70 percent of the fertility decline from the 1935-39 birth cohort to the 1951-53 cohort. Although women's labor force participation also increased over this period, our results indicate a weak link between declines in fertility and increases in women's labor foree participation at low levels of schooling. Looking at the partial effects estimated from regressions that include dummy variables for single years of wife's and husband's schooling, an increase in wife's schooling from zero years to four years is associated with a decline of almost one full birth in fertility up to age 30. At the same time, the predicted probability of a 30-34-year-old wife working in the labor market increases only slightly, from 0.30 to 0.35, when the wife's schooling increases from zero to four years, and increases to only 0.40 when her schooling rises to eight years. These small increases in labor supply are especially surprising given the large wage increases associated with these early years of schooling. An increase from zero to four years of schooling is associated with almost a doubling of wages, and an increase from zero to eight years with more than a tripling of wages. The small increases in labor force participation at low levels of schooling contrast with the very large increase, from 0.4 to 0.75, predicted when the wife's schooling increases from eight years to 12 years. Similar patterns are observed for women of ail ages, indicating that these anomalies are not explained by life cycle of fertility and work.
Although the relationship between schooling and wife's labor supply is relatively weak, we estimate large positive effects of schooling on measures of child quality. Increases in both the wife's and husband's schooling at low levels are associated with large improvements in children's probability of survival and schooling attainment. We interpret our results as evidence that increases in schooling at low levels lead to large increases in parents' ability to produce healthier and better educated children. Parents respond to this greater productivity by increasing investments in child quality and reducing the nutnber of children. Increases in home productivity are large enough to offset large increases in tnarket wages up to about eight years of schooling, with the result that wives do not increase their labor supply in spite of large declines in fertility. This quantity-quality tradeoff, we argue, is much more important in explaining the link between fertility and schooling at low levels than is the effect of increasing labor market opportunities for women. 
